Same Companies, Different Results
The S&P 500 slipped 0.9% in October. The S&P 500 Equal Weight Index, holding the very same companies, beat it by nearly six percentage points, its widest relative delta since April 2009.1
Of course, the same companies made up each index. They all reported the same earnings. They were all subject to similar interest rates, tariffs, and other fiscal and monetary policy considerations. And they all reacted to questions around AI spend. The only difference was how many dollars each index placed behind each company.
Investors devote considerable energy to debating whether the “market” is expensive, or how it might weather the next shock. Far less attention goes to a more basic question: What exactly is the “market” that a portfolio is measured against? Selecting an index makes a series of choices on an investor’s behalf, the most consequential being how much to own of each company. A market capitalization-weighted index places the most capital behind the companies the market already values most. That may be a sensible proxy for the productive capacity of listed companies, but it is also a wager.
Every portfolio, meanwhile, has a job: funding retirement, supporting a family, compounding capital for a future need, etc. An index has no job; it simply measures. The work, then, is twofold: 1) Understand the wager an index makes, and 2) test whether the wager serves the job.
Three Answers from the Same Index
There are many ways to decide which stocks an index includes and how much of each it owns. To illustrate, assume a universe of only 3 companies.
| Company | Sector | Equity Market Value | Share Price |
|---|---|---|---|
| A | Information Technology | $600B | $60 |
| B | Information Technology | $300B | $30 |
| C | Health Care | $100B | $100 |
Weighting each company by market capitalization, as with the S&P 500 (based on float), would invest 60%, 30% and 10% in A, B and C, respectively. Weighting by share price, as is done in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, would invest 52.6% in the smallest company (C), given the relative size of $100 versus $190. Finally, an equal weight of each security would invest approximately 33% in each company, with periodic rebalancing.
Assume that at the end of the period, A decreased by 10%, B was constant, and C increased by 20%:
| Weighting Method | Portfolio Price Return |
|---|---|
| Market cap-weighted | -4.0% |
| Price-weighted | +7.4% |
| Equal-weighted | +3.3% |
Each stock earned exactly the same return under every method; only the dollars behind each differed. Yet the results range from a 4.0% loss to a 7.4% gain. Sector exposure diverges just as sharply: 90% of the cap-weighted portfolio sits in Information Technology, vs. ~67% of the equal-weighted one. The real indices show the same gap. As of late August, the S&P 500 Equal Weight Index held ~17% in technology, compared with 38% for the standard S&P.
Darlings, Automatically
A by-product of market cap weighting is that appreciating stocks automatically command a larger share of the portfolio. As a result, the composition of the S&P 500 has changed dramatically over the past 10 years.
At year-end 2015, the top 10 stocks comprised 19% of the index, as well as about 19% of total profits.2 In addition to Apple, Microsoft, Facebook, and Alphabet (all Information Technology in 2015), there were ExxonMobil (Energy), Johnson & Johnson (Health Care), Berkshire Hathaway and Wells Fargo (Financials), General Electric (Industrials), and Amazon (Consumer Discretionary). At year-end 2025, on the other hand, the top 10 stocks represented an all-time high 40.7% of the index, but only about 32% of expected earnings. The “Magnificent 7” (a term that did not exist before 2023) accounted for 12.3% at year-end 2015, counting the six then included (Tesla joined in December 2020), versus 33% at the end of October 2026.3
Source: RBC Wealth Management, FactSet; data as of 12/31/25
No one decided to increase the relative weights of these stocks; they rose because the index invests most heavily in the companies with the greatest anticipated outcomes and adds to those positions as anticipation grows.
In my previous article, “Good Company. Bad Stock.”, I described how Walmart compounded diluted EPS at 12% a year from FY2000 through 2011, while its share price appreciated ~1% a year. The business delivered. But at nearly 44x earnings, the starting valuation had already absorbed much of the reward, and the multiple compressed to ~12.5x over the period.4 That is expectation risk: the possibility that a business performs well while its stock disappoints because the price demanded something better.
A cap-weighted index makes expectation risk structural. Its largest positions are, by construction, the market’s darlings, the companies whose prices embed the most optimism. An individual investor must choose to step onto the “treadmill of the admired.” The index places every holder on it, automatically.
When the Wager Reverses
October showed the mechanism running in reverse. Technology made up 37% of the S&P 500’s value,5 and skepticism over the scale of AI spending, and the timing of its payoff, weighed on the largest names. Q3 results offered little relief: Through early November, the Mag7 companies that had reported fell short of earnings estimates by 14.7% in aggregate, while S&P 500 companies overall exceeded them by 1.9%.6 Through November 10, the Bloomberg Mag7 Index was up
+4.1% for the year on a price basis, versus +10.9% for the S&P 500 and +16.9% for its equal-weighted counterpart.7
History cuts both ways. From 2003 through 2022, the equal-weighted index outperformed its cap-weighted counterpart by ~1.5% per year. Over the three years through 2025, however, the cap-weighted index outperformed by 32%, surpassing the 31% peak reached in the leadup to the tech bubble and ranking among the largest three-year relative outperformances on record.8 October’s reversal serves as an illustration of how an index built to represent 500 businesses can deliver an experience shaped by only a handful. The concentration that magnifies returns when leadership is narrow works just as forcefully in reverse when expectations change.
Every Index Is a Wager
The cap weighting design is inexpensive to own, requires little trading, and is tax-efficient, since it never sells its winners to rebalance. It reflects, rather than second-guesses, the market’s collective judgment. At the same time, its arithmetic mechanisms can easily cause it to place more weight on certain judgements and expectations than others.
Nor is equal weighting a neutral alternative. It makes its own wager: a structural tilt toward smaller and less expensive companies, higher turnover, and a standing commitment to trim winners and add to laggards. It will trail in any period when the largest companies keep pulling ahead, as it did from 2023 through 2025.
Neither “own the market” nor “own the average stock” is a complete answer, any more than “buy quality” or “buy cheap” was in my last piece.
The Job
The more useful question is whether the wager fits the job (what a portfolio must accomplish for its owner), and two checks go a long way: First, what does the price require? In mid-October, the S&P 500 traded at 21.5x forward earnings versus 16.8x for its equal-weighted counterpart9, a 28% premium – expectation risk measured at the index level. Second, do the distributions match the spending? At a 1.13% dividend yield as of October-end10, $1M in the index generates $11.3K a year; an investor needing $40K must fund 72% of it by selling shares at whatever price the market offers that day. An income objective does not excuse poor total returns, but beating the index and “doing the job” are not the same measure.
Chasing the Scoreboard
The behavioral pull here is strong. Suppose an investor has built a portfolio suited to its job, and the index then outperforms it, carried by a handful of names. The index’s return is published daily; progress toward the job is not. Regret follows, then the temptation to close the gap.
And concentration makes that temptation even more costly. Keeping pace with a top-heavy index requires owning the same seven to ten companies in roughly the same size, usually after they have risen and at much higher multiples. In my last article, admiration blurred into valuation for a single stock. Here, the scoreboard does the blurring for an entire portfolio: The investor stops asking what the price requires and starts asking why he or she does not own more of it.
The discipline is to remember that an index records the outcome of a wager, not an obligation. Trailing it in a narrow, expensive market is not, by itself, evidence that a portfolio is failing at its job.
The market does not know, nor care, when you retire, what you spend, or whom you hope to support. Those details belong in the investment decision and personal framework, even though they never appear in the index. Before asking how your portfolio performed relative to the market, make sure you understand which market you’re comparing it against, and why.
Ishan Chhabra
Analyst, Equity Research
Trevor Cummings
PWA Group Director, Partner
Blaine Carver
Private Wealth Advisor
Brett Bonecutter
Private Wealth Advisor
Sources:
1 Wall Street Journal, “Equal-Weight S&P Index Beat the S&P 500 Last Month by Most Since 2009” (Nov 2026).
2 RBC Wealth Management, “The Great Narrowing: S&P 500 Concentration” (2026).
3 S&P Dow Jones Indices, “Dashboard: S&P 500 Factor Indices” (Oct 2026).
4 Thoughts on Money, “Good Company. Bad Stock.” (2026).
5 S&P Dow Jones Indices (Oct 2026).
6 FactSet, “Mag7 Now Reporting Lower Earnings Growth Than the Other 493” (Nov 2026).
7 First Trust Advisors, “Worth the Weight?” (Nov 2026).
8 RBC Wealth Management, “The Great Narrowing: S&P 500 Concentration” (2026).
9 First Trust, “SMID Earnings Persistence” (Oct 2026).
10 FactSet Data (Oct 2026).